An Aretaic Approach to Epistemic Justice
Conceptual Precisions and Practical Projections
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.35305/cf2.vi22.271Keywords:
Aretaic Turn, Epistemic Justice, Intellectual Virtues, Judicial VirtuesAbstract
This paper revolves around the notion of epistemic justice, a notion that will be addressed here, primarily, as an intellectual virtue. In order to provide a framework to discuss this concept, the aretaic turn in contemporary epistemology will be taken as a starting point, and concomitantly, the two main approaches to the notion of intellectual virtue that have been taken place in this turn will be identified. In a second moment, the examination of the structure of the virtue of epistemic justice shall be provided on the basis of Miranda Fricker’s theory, which draws on a Neo-Aristotelian approach. Finally, an understanding of epistemic justice as a central virtue of adjudication shall be proposed, offering at the same time an explanation of its importance in spite of some criticisms that might be addressed against such an understanding.
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