Is the social normative? Toward reordering the use of the normative vocabulary in social ontology
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.35305/cf2.vi22.275Keywords:
Social ontology, Normativity, Normative attitudes, Social coerción, Social reproductionAbstract
This paper aims at recommending a rearrangement of the use of normative vocabulary in contemporary social ontology. This reordering involves two steps: in the fist place, it resists the methodological temptation to conceive any social phenomenon in normative terms; and secondly, it reserves the use of normative vocabulary to account for specific social phenomena. To show the plausibility of this rearrangement, we examine two important social phenomena: social coercion and social reproduction. As regards social coercion, we argue that it is not necessary to construe the pressure exerted by social institutions on individuals in terms of normative statuses, and we suggest reserving the vocabulary of obligations or duties to account for specific instances of group action. With respect to social reproduction, we argue that appealing to certain normative attitudes of acceptance is explanatorily vacuous to account for it, and we propose reserving the vocabulary of normative attitudes for conceptualizing specific moments of intervention in social reality.
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