The Aristotelian notions of δύναμις and δυνατóν in Heidegger’s Möglichkeit of Sein und Zeit

Abstract

In this paper, we start from the hypothesis that Heidegger has in mind the Aristotelian notions of δύναμις (dýnamis) and δυνατóν (dynatón), when he theorizes his concept of possibility (Möglichkeit) in Sein und Zeit, but not with the sole purpose of assimilating the aforementioned conceptualizations -appropriation that, as we will see subsequently, is not full-, but also, to radicalize them, assuming a frankly superior point of view. We support this thesis, in principle, on the fact that Aristotle thought that the ἐνέργεια (enérgeia) or ἐντελέχεια (entelécheia) is, in general terms, prior (πρότερον/próteron) with respect to the dýnamis. This theoretical position being revised and renewed by Heidegger in the reviewed text. In addition, Heidegger puts into question the Aristotelian thesis of fundamentality of Wirklichkeit (effective reality) and therefore the Aristotelian concept of being (εἶναι/eînai), ἐστίν (estín) or what it is (ὄν/ón), indicating not only that the possibility is more original than the effective reality, but also that the realization of a possibility never implies the transition to an effective reality. In addition, the Heidegger's link with Aristotle began very early -more specifically, in the year 1907-, thanks to the reading of Franz Brentano's doctoral thesis, and has continued constantly since 1921, when Heidegger gave a seminar on De Anima at the University of Freiburg.