Training and Assessment of Know-How from a Wittgensteinian Perspective

Abstract

Gilbert Ryle devoted much of his work to emphasizing the distinctive nature of know-how, offering a critique of Cartesian and intellectualist models of mind, knowledge, and behavior. He underscored its essential connection to training: unlike know-that or moral virtues, know-how requires not only learning but also sustained practice to avoid being forgotten (1958/2009d). Whereas learning allows for the acquisition of skills, training keeps them active, refines them, and adapts them to new situations. This conception has influenced several contemporary anti-intellectualist models, the most prominent being that of Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986). According to them, know-how is not acquired by following explicit rules, but through the sedimentation of successful experiences that generate dispositions to act skillfully. In this article, we present and critique their model, arguing that it fails to capture the epistemic dimension of know-how. Instead, we propose a pragmatist framework grounded in a Wittgensteinian analysis of training, which, we suggest, offers a more accurate account of know-how as embedded within normatively structured social practices. From this perspective, training not only preserves and enhances skills, but also involves aligning with shared standards—thereby highlighting its normative character and clarifying the criteria that guide and regulate its exercise.