Functional explanation and systemic analysis
The case of modern aphasiology
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.35305/cf2.vi19.176Keywords:
explanation, function, systemic analysis, aphasiology, mechanismAbstract
In this article we maintain that, in those cases in which the explanandum capacity of a systemic or mechanistic analysis constitutes a biological function, globally, the function explains the structure and not the other way around, despite the fact that in some particular cases, the order in which the concepts participating in the explanation are determined does not coincide with the order of the explanation. To defend this thesis, we will adopt a minimal conception of explanation based on the idea of ampliative subsumption of structuralism and we will illustrate the differences between the order of explanation and the order of determination of concepts through a case study taken from modern aphasiology.
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