Normativity and Reasoning
Observations on Broome’s Dispositional Analysis
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.35305/cf2.vi22.279Keywords:
Normativity, Reasoning, Rationality, John BroomeAbstract
This article examines the relationship between rationality, normativity, and reasoning, focusing on the alternative that John Broome offers to the traditional view that links these notions to normative reasons. According to the dominant perspective, being rational involves correctly responding to reasons, understood as factors that justify beliefs or actions. Broome, by contrast, proposes a not necessarily normative conception of reasoning, understood as the intentional following of rules. The article reconstructs and analyzes the main elements of his view, including his distinction between genuine and non-genuine normativity, his characterization of rationality as coherence among attitudes, and his account of reasoning as a guided but not normatively demanding activity. Through a critical evaluation, it is argued that this conception faces three objections: its difficulty in distinguishing genuine reasoning from mere associative transitions, its limited capacity to account for the epistemic character of reasoning, and its apparent indifference to the rational demands that emerge from a subject’s own attitudes. Finally, it is suggested that Broome’s proposal can be interpreted as a form of normative skepticism, analogous to the kind Christine Korsgaard has identified in the domain of morality, offering a broader perspective on the philosophical commitments and limitations of his theory.
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