Punto de vista lógico y no representacionista del razonamiento sustitutivo

Autores

  • Juan Redmond Universidad de Valparaíso (Valparaíso,Valparaíso, Chile)
  • Rodrigo Lopez-Orellana Universidad de Salamanca (Salamanca, Castilla y León, España)
  • Loreto Paniagua Universidad de Valparaíso (Valparaíso,Valparaíso, Chile)

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.35305/cf2.vi18.147

Palavras-chave:

razonamiento subrogativo, inferencia, modelización, representación, lógica

Resumo

En el presente artículo defendemos, desde un enfoque inferencialista, que la función inferencial que desempeña un modelo (FIM) durante la práctica de modelización es independiente de la noción de representación comprometida con el enfoque de modelización elegido. En efecto, creemos que la noción de razonamiento sustitutivo o subrogativo (surrogative reasoning) no es ni subsidiaria ni está fundada en la noción de representación y que solo encontrará sus fundamentos en la propia lógica. Ni la noción de representación es una noción inferencial ni la FIM es un tipo de pensamiento basado en la representación.

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Publicado

2021-12-30

Como Citar

Redmond, J., Lopez-Orellana, R., & Paniagua, L. (2021). Punto de vista lógico y no representacionista del razonamiento sustitutivo. Cuadernos Filosóficos / Segunda Época, (18). https://doi.org/10.35305/cf2.vi18.147

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